The RAPIDD Ebola forecasting challenge:Model description and synthetic data generation by Ajelli, Marco et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
The RAPIDD Ebola forecasting challenge
Ajelli, Marco; Zhang, Qian; Sun, Kaiyuan; Merler, Stefano; Fumanelli, Laura; Chowell,
Gerardo; Simonsen, Lone; Viboud, Cecile; Vespignani, Alessandro
Published in:
Epidemics
DOI:
10.1016/j.epidem.2017.09.001
Publication date:
2018
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
CC BY-NC-ND
Citation for published version (APA):
Ajelli, M., Zhang, Q., Sun, K., Merler, S., Fumanelli, L., Chowell, G., ... Vespignani, A. (2018). The RAPIDD
Ebola forecasting challenge: Model description and synthetic data generation. Epidemics, 22, 3-12.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epidem.2017.09.001
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Epidemics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/epidemics
The RAPIDD Ebola forecasting challenge: Model description and synthetic
data generation
Marco Ajellia,b,⁎, Qian Zhanga, Kaiyuan Suna, Stefano Merlerb, Laura Fumanellib,
Gerardo Chowellc,d, Lone Simonsend,e, Cecile Viboudd, Alessandro Vespignania,f,⁎
a Laboratory for the Modeling of Biological and Socio-technical Systems, Northeastern University, Boston, USA
b Bruno Kessler Foundation (FBK), Trento, Italy
c School of Public Health, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA
d Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, USA
e Department of Public Health, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
f Institute for Scientiﬁc Interchange Foundation, Turin, Italy
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Ebola
Forecast
Computational modeling
A B S T R A C T
The Ebola forecasting challenge organized by the Research and Policy for Infectious Disease Dynamics (RAPIDD)
program of the Fogarty International Center relies on synthetic disease datasets generated by numerical simu-
lations of a highly detailed spatially-structured agent-based model. We discuss here the architecture and tech-
nical steps of the challenge, leading to datasets that mimic as much as possible the data collection, reporting, and
communication process experienced in the 2014–2015 West African Ebola outbreak. We provide a detailed
discussion of the model's deﬁnition, the epidemiological scenarios’ construction, synthetic patient database
generation and the data communication platform used during the challenge. Finally we oﬀer a number of
considerations and takeaways concerning the extension and scalability of synthetic challenges to other infectious
diseases.
1. Introduction
The RAPIDD Ebola forecasting challenge arose from an Ebola
Modeling workshop organized in March 2015 as part of the Research
and Policy for Infectious Disease Dynamics (RAPIDD) program of the
Fogarty International Center, US National Institutes of Health (NIH).
The workshop convened the major academic teams that were involved
in generating disease forecasts during the 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola
outbreak to explore the successes and failures of disease forecasting in
relation to this particular emergency. At the conclusion of the work-
shop, the participants agreed that a disease forecasting challenge re-
lying on well-deﬁned and ground-truth synthetic datasets would pro-
vide unique testbeds for objective assessment of the performance of
multiple models in real-time.
Accordingly, we launched an Ebola forecasting challenge in
August–December 2015 that relied on synthetic epidemic datasets de-
rived from an agent-based “mother model”. We considered four sce-
narios involving diﬀerent levels of data accuracy, availability, and in-
terventions, and were reminiscent of the epidemic in West Africa. These
synthetic datasets were used as a basis to assess forecasting perfor-
mance of 8 competing teams during the course of the Ebola challenge.
In this paper, we describe the technical architecture of the RAPIDD
Ebola forecasting challenge, including generation of synthetic disease
datasets, development of a web interface to support data visualization
and exchange with the challenge participants, and generation of con-
textual information.
Synthetic datasets for the Ebola forecasting challenge were derived
from a highly detailed spatially-structured agent-based model (Ajelli
et al., 2016; Merler et al., 2015) in order to achieve the level of re-
solution necessary to mimic realistic epidemic scenarios. The model
was previously used in the context of the 2014 West Africa Ebola out-
break to assess the eﬀect of control interventions and the probability of
elimination (Merler et al., 2015; Ajelli et al., 2016). The epidemic
model integrated detailed data on local demography, case isolation,
Ebola treatment units, contact tracing, and safe burial interventions –
factors that were taken into account in several other modeling studies
(Merler et al., 2016; Ajelli et al., 2015; Lewnard et al., 2014; Meltzer
et al., 2014; Kucharski et al., 2015; Pandey et al., 2014; Rivers et al.,
2014; Weitz and Dushoﬀ, 2015; Fang et al., 2016). Individual level
information, spatial context, and health-care related transmission
characteristics derived from model runs could be summarized in syn-
thetic patient line lists and aggregated epidemiological time series.
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Real-world situations are always aﬀected by the so-called “fog of
war” that arises from the data reporting process. For instance, data are
not communicated in real time and a variable degree of under-reporting
is always present. Moreover, patient records may contain errors and
missing data (WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014). For this reason, the
challenge accounted for the “noise” introduced during collection and
reporting of epidemiological data. Further more each synthetic scenario
was accompanied by contextual information (in the form of situation
reports), which was not necessarily precise and was often qualitative in
nature, but was nevertheless relevant for challenge participants to de-
ﬁne modeling assumptions.
The performance of the diﬀerent models participating in the
RAPIDD Ebola challenge are described in an accompanying article
(Viboud et al., 2017); here we aim to provide a detailed account of the
process used for generating the synthetic data and displaying in-
formation in the challenge. First, we describe the mother model and the
assumptions underlying the generation of the synthetic datasets asso-
ciated with each of the four challenge scenarios. Second, we describe
the “fog of war” rules applied to data generated by the agent-based
model to introduce diﬀerent levels of data precision. Finally, we pro-
vide a detailed description of the databases and the contextual in-
formation provided to participating teams during the course of the
Ebola challenge.
2. Methods
The data provided for the Challenge were derived from the output of
a mother agent-based model, which is a variant of the ones presented in
Merler et al. (2015) and Ajelli et al. (2016) for Liberia and Guinea. The
original models were speciﬁcally calibrated for the 2014 Ebola epi-
demic in West Africa and were able to reproduce the spreading patterns
and trends observed in the actual epidemic. In order to generate the
synthetic data used in the challenge, key parameters deﬁning the nat-
ural history of the disease in the model were varied. Furthermore, in-
terventions and containment policies were implemented with plausible
timelines but diﬀerently from the historical case of 2014 epidemic.
Moreover, diﬀerently from Merler et al. (2015) but according to Ajelli
et al. (2016), the model took into account two important features ob-
served in the 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic: the heterogeneity in trans-
mission potential among individuals (with the presence of super-
spreaders), and the diﬀerent susceptibility to infection in children and
adults. The model diﬀered from Merler et al. (2015) and Ajelli et al.
(2016) also in terms of the distributions of key time periods and of the
implemented interventions. Simulations were computationally in-
tensive; thus the model was coded in C language. In this section we
detail the model's deﬁnition, the intervention strategies and the selec-
tion of the stochastic runs used to generate the challenge data. How the
model's output has been ﬁltered and communicated to the teams
Fig. 1. (A) Map of Liberia with county capitals, major hospitals and po-
pulation. (B) Ebola transmission dynamic scheme. The values and the
distribution of the transition times are reported in the Supplementary
Information.
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participating to the challenge is reported in Section 3. All the data and
materials generated for the challenge are publicly available at the web
page: http://www.ebola-challenge.org/.
2.1. Model deﬁnition
As in Merler et al. (2015) and Ajelli et al. (2016), the population was
grouped in households and hospitals, and health care workers were
explicitly represented. Infection transmission was stochastic and spe-
ciﬁc interventions were simulated. The model accounted for three
routes of transmission: transmission in households and to the extended
family, transmission in hospitals, and transmission during funerals (to
household and extended family members). The population of Liberia
was subdivided into 15 administrative counties; for each county we
placed the corresponding capital in the exact location given by GPS
coordinates and with the exact number of inhabitants as obtained from
census data. Simulated individuals were grouped into households and
assigned to villages and capital city by preserving the population den-
sity at the level of county, and in order to match demographic in-
formation derived from the 2007 Demographic Health Surveys
(Program, 2007) on household size and demographics for Liberia (see
the Supplementary information for details). Hospitals were located on
the territory according to their actual location as reported in the Hu-
manitarian Data Exchange database (United Nations Oﬃce for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Aﬀairs, 2015). Each hospital was char-
acterized by number of beds and number of health care workers (HCW),
which were determined in order to match statistics available from the
WHO Regional Oﬃce for Africa (2014). The counties considered, the
population density, and the location of hospitals is shown in Fig. 1A.
Each individual in the population was explicitly simulated as an
agent of the individual based model, with an associated epidemiological
status. The natural history of the disease followed the one used in
Merler et al. (2015), as outlined in Fig. 1B. Speciﬁcally, susceptible
individuals could acquire infection after contact with an infectious in-
dividual and become latent (asymptomatic). At the end of the latent
period, assumed to be equal to the incubation period for Ebola as there
is no evidence of Ebola transmission before symptom onset, latent in-
dividuals became infectious (symptomatic). Infectious individuals
could transmit the infection, to both household members and members
of the extended family. Ebola infections would either lead to hospita-
lization, death or recovery. Hospitalized individuals could transmit the
infection to HCW and inpatients; afterwards, they would either die or
recover. However, after recovery, a hospitalized individual remained in
the hospital (though no longer infectious) for an additional period of
time before being discharged. Deceased individuals could transmit in-
fection to household and extended family members during funerals, and
were then removed from the model. As in the West African Ebola
outbreak, we accounted for contact tracing, an important aspect of
disease control. In the Ebola forecasting challenge model, individuals
belonging to the contact tracing pool were constantly checked and
admitted to a hospital/ETU at the onset of symptoms.
The progression of infection is characterized by seven key time
periods deﬁning the natural history of the disease: the incubation
period (which is the time between infection and the onset of symp-
toms); the interval from symptom onset to hospital admission; the in-
terval from hospital admission to death; the interval from hospital ad-
mission to the end of infectivity; the interval from hospital admission to
discharge; the interval from symptom onset to death; the interval from
symptom onset to the end of the infectivity. Each key time period in the
infection process was randomly sampled for every individual. In par-
ticular, time from death to burial was assumed to follow a truncated
exponential distribution with mean 2 days and maximum 3 days, while
all other key time periods (such as the incubation period, the time from
symptom onset to admission, etc.) were assumed to be gamma dis-
tributed, in agreement with (WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014). Values
for these parameters were chosen in such a way as to obtain plausible
scenarios for an Ebola epidemic similar to the one experienced in West
Africa (see Supplementary Information for a full list of parameters). In
the early transmission phase the reproduction number was calibrated to
be around 1.5–1.6, in agreement with early estimates in West Africa
(WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014; Chowell and Nishiura, 2014;
Nishiura and Chowell, 2014; Fisman et al., 2014; Merler et al., 2015;
Gomes et al., 2014).
As in Ajelli et al. (2016), the Ebola forecasting challenge model
included two important features observed in the 2014–2015 Ebola
epidemic: heterogeneity in transmission rates among individuals, and
diﬀerences in susceptibility to infection between children and adults.
This choice was supported by modeling studies of the 2014–2015 Ebola
epidemic in West Africa, which highlighted that a small fraction of
infected individuals were responsible for a large majority of secondary
cases (presence of superspreaders) (Ajelli et al., 2015; Althaus, 2015;
Faye et al., 2015; WHO Ebola Response Team, 2016a), recently con-
ﬁrmed in WHO Ebola Response Team (2016b) and Lau et al. (2017). In
the model we assumed that each infectious individual had a diﬀerent
infection transmission potential, which was sampled from a gamma
distribution of mean 1 and a given shape. This is equivalent to using a
negative binomial distribution for the distribution of secondary cases,
with dispersion equal to the shape of the gamma distribution. Further,
in line with previous studies of the 2014–2015 West African outbreak
(Ajelli et al., 2015; WHO Ebola Response Team, 2015), we assumed an
age-dependent risk of infection, with children being less susceptible to
infection with the Ebola virus than adults. Accordingly, we introduced a
parameter accounting for the relative susceptibility of 0–14 years old,
equal to one-fourth of that of adults (Ajelli et al., 2015). Lastly, the
Challenge model diﬀered from that in Merler et al. (2015) in terms of
the distributions of key time periods and implemented interventions.
More details on the computational implementation of the transmission
mechanisms are provided in the Supplementary Information.
2.2. Modeling of intervention strategies
The challenge model was used to explore four diﬀerent epidemic
scenarios, each characterized by diﬀerent disease parameters and in-
tensity of interventions aimed at controlling the epidemic. In particular
the challenge model accounted for the following interventions:
• Hospitals and ETUs. ETUs were put in place and opened according
to the spatio-temporal spread of the epidemic in particular simula-
tions. Each Ebola case was assigned a hospitalization probability,
based on bed availability in hospitals/ETUs. If an ETU with avail-
able beds was located in the same county as the case, the Ebola
patient was directly admitted to that ETU; otherwise, the patient
ﬁrst went to the hospital that was closest to his/her place of re-
sidence and had space. Then, for the three days following hospital
admission, if there was an available bed in any of the ETUs of the
county, the patient was transferred to the closest one; otherwise he/
she remained in the hospital where he/she was ﬁrst admitted. If all
hospitals and ETUs were at maximum capacity, the patient re-
mained at home. We assumed that ETUs were exclusively used to
treat Ebola patients. In contrast, general hospitals could admit in-
dividuals presenting diﬀerent pathologies (and thus susceptible to
Ebola infection) as well as true Ebola patients. Non-Ebola patients
were hospitalized for 7 days on average. We assumed that when a
hospital had availability, Ebola cases were prioritized, and then non-
Ebola patients were admitted until the hospital reached full capa-
city. In other words, an Ebola case that was hospitalized in an ETU
could transmit the infection to the HCWs of that ETU only; while an
Ebola case hospitalized in a general hospital could transmit to HCWs
and to non-Ebola patients hospitalized in the same facility and at the
same time.
• Contact tracing. Once an individual was admitted to the hospital/
ETU, a number of his/her contacts, chosen among members of his/
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her extended family (including his/her own household), were
monitored starting at time t after admission; this parameter varied
over time and by scenario. Traced contacts could then either remain
in their original status (e.g., susceptible, recovered) or become in-
fected. If a traced contact became infected, the contact was admitted
to the hospital/ETU (if there were available beds) on the ﬁrst day
that he/she experienced symptoms. In contrast, for Ebola cases
arising outside of the contact tracing process, we assumed a time
delay between symptom onset and admission to the hospital/ETU
(i.e., the time interval from symptom onset to hospitalization).
• Safe burials. Once an Ebola patient died, he/she could be buried
either safely (i.e., no onward transmission could occur) or unsafely
(i.e., there was a non-zero probability of transmission). Speciﬁcally,
three possibilities were considered: (1) the individual died in the
community (i.e., he was not previously admitted to hospital/ETU)
and was safely or unsafely buried depending on a daily scenario-
dependent probability; (2) the individual died in an ETU, in which
case, he was buried safely; (3) the individual died in a hospital. In
this case, in the ﬁrst three months of the epidemic (that is, up to 89
days the ﬁrst Ebola case report) the body was released to the family
and buried in the community (as described in point 1). Later in the
course of the outbreak, all patients dying in the hospital were buried
safely.
• Behavioral changes. We accounted for reactive behavioral changes
in the population such as avoiding or limiting contacts with bodily
ﬂuids of Ebola cases (e.g., in the family setting or when visiting
patients in hospitals), mirroring increased awareness in the general
population during the course of the epidemic. We modeled this
phenomenon by scaling the three baseline Ebola transmission rates
(family, hospital/ETU, funeral) by the same factor, for each day of
the simulation. These time-dependent scaling factors were speciﬁc
to each scenario.
We considered four diﬀerent epidemiological scenarios, each one
deﬁned by a diﬀerent set of interventions. In Supplementary
Information, we report graphically a summary of the interventions used
in each scenario by visualizing the evolution in the cumulative number
of ETUs beds, the daily number of traced contacts, the rate of safe
burial, and the reduction in transmission due to behavioral changes.
The timeline of interventions dictated the course of the epidemic and
thus controlled peak timing and the magnitude of the outbreak.
Interventions could ﬂuctuate in time, mirroring changes in intervention
eﬃcacy due to resource constraints, as observed in the 2014–2015 West
Africa Ebola outbreak.
In addition to diﬀerences in the timing and intensity of control in-
terventions, we used diﬀerent natural history parameters for each sce-
nario, which contributed to generate diﬀerent epidemic trajectories. A
table summarizing scenario-speciﬁc disease parameters is provided in
the Supplementary Information. Overall, there was less variability in
the choice of disease parameters than in the deﬁnition of interventions
because we aimed to reproduce a natural disease history compatible
with the Ebola patterns observed in the West African and historical
outbreaks.
2.3. Stochastic variability and selected realizations
As we used a stochastic model, repeat runs of the model with the
same set of initial conditions, disease parameters, and interventions,
could result in diﬀerent epidemic realizations that are all plausible.
While some runs may substantially deviate from the ensemble of sto-
chastic realizations (e.g., some runs led to early epidemic extinction),
we selected epidemic realizations that fell within the 50% interquartile
range of the ensemble. That is, for each scenario we selected a single
realization lying asymptotically close to the median of curves of cu-
mulative cases, for realizations that did not go extinct (see Fig. 2).
Therefore, each synthetic dataset shared with challenge participants
corresponded to a unique stochastic realization of the epidemic and
included all ﬂuctuations and stochastic variability associated with a
single realization under a given epidemiological scenario, as would a
real outbreak. The resulting synthetic epidemic curves representing the
number of cases or deaths over time exhibited substantial ﬂuctuations;
in contrast, averaging over the ensemble of stochastic realizations
would have resulted in unrealistically smooth curves.
Our selected set of stochastic realizations also allowed for unequi-
vocal spatio-temporal assignation of individual cases and a complete
line-list of patients comprising detailed individual-level information,
similar in spirit to the one obtained during the 2014–2015 Ebola epi-
demic in West Africa (WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014). In addition,
the spatial structure of the model reproduced heterogeneity in the
timing and impact of the epidemic across diﬀerent counties of Liberia.
Each selected stochastic realization of the model had a particular spatial
and temporal evolution captured by county-level incidence data. In
Fig. 3 we report the cumulative number of infections as a function of
time for each county in the four selected realizations before the appli-
cation of the additional noise use to simulate the “fog of war” (see
Section 3.3). The ﬁgure shows that the most aﬀected counties and the
timing of the epidemic in each county depend on the initial conditions
and the level of intervention strategies in each scenario.
3. Results
The performances of the various models used by the 8 participating
teams in the RAPIDD Ebola forecasting challenge, and ensemble pre-
dictions, are described elsewhere (Viboud et al., 2017). Here, the results
of this particular article concentrate on the preparation of the synthetic
epidemiological data and the contextual information shared with
challenge participants during the course of the competition. In parti-
cular synthetic data generated for each epidemiological scenario with
the methodology described above were organized in a database format
and shared with the teams through a dedicated password-protected
website. Synthetic epidemiological time series and patient line lists
were supplemented with additional information contextualizing the
data in the form of situation reports. Data access and communication
with the challenge participants was processed through the web inter-
face (see Fig. 4). The teams were presented with outbreak data corre-
sponding to ﬁve diﬀerent times of the 4 synthetic scenarios. Typically
for each scenario, we chose two time points in the ascending phase of
the epidemic, a time point near the peak, and two time points in the
descending phase (with the exception of Scenario 4, characterized by a
prolonged ascending phase). At each of the ﬁve data release time
points, challenge participants were given access to an incrementally
larger database containing information up to that point of the epidemic.
All ﬁles are accessible upon request. For each of the 5 prediction time
points, the teams were asked to provide forecasts for a number of target
estimates, including 1- to 4-week ahead weekly incidences, peak
timing, peak magnitude, case fatality rate estimate and reproduction
number estimates. Separate forecasts were requested for each of the 4
scenarios.
3.1. Scenarios’ overview
The Ebola Challenge database included the four scenarios described
in the previous sections. A diﬀerent level of data quantity/quality ap-
plied to each scenario. In addition, the “diﬃculty” level oﬀered by each
scenario was also determined by the choice of the intervention strate-
gies and/or selected realization of the epidemic.
• Scenario 1. With this scenario, the participating teams were oﬀered
a “Data Rich” situation in which from Day 1 of reporting the
modelers had access to the full patient database, with a staggered
ramp up of interventions that ultimately controlled the outbreak.
Although aﬀected by the “fog of war”, all timelines and individual-
M. Ajelli et al. Epidemics 22 (2018) 3–12
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Fig. 2. Stochastic simulation output. 95% CI, 50% CI, median simulation and the simulation selected as representative for the scenario are depicted. (A) Scenario 1. (B) Scenario 2. (C)
Scenario 3. (D) Scenario 4.
Fig. 3. Cumulative number of cases as a function of time in each county of Liberia for the four scenarios considered in the challenge. Each epidemic is based on the stochastic simulation
selected in Fig. 2.
M. Ajelli et al. Epidemics 22 (2018) 3–12
7
level patient databases were available along with fairly detailed si-
tuation reports. Age statistics were provided for each data release as
well. Data were available at the national and county level. In ad-
dition, a large branch of the transmission tree was provided for the
teams.
• Scenario 2. This was a “data poor” scenario in which individual-
level patient data was unavailable to participating teams throughout
the challenge. Only timelines and national age statistics were re-
leased, along with situation reports providing contextual informa-
tion. Two small branches of transmission trees were provided; this
was a controlled outbreak as well.
• Scenario 3. Like Scenario 2, this was a “data poor” situation, with
additional complications. The scenario was based on a far from ty-
pical stochastic realization for the ﬁrst two months of the outbreak.
In addition the implementation of intervention strategies was
characterized by an abrupt change within the time span of a single
week. The situation reports were not detailed nor reliable. National
ETU occupancy rate was provided after the 3rd data release, while
individual-level patient data were provided for the 5th and ﬁnal
data release. Two small branches of transmission trees were pro-
vided; the outbreak was ultimately controlled.
• Scenario 4. This scenario was complicated by the fact that the
outbreak is uncontrolled; i.e. does not present a clear inﬂection
point, with no true declining phase, during the entire challenge. This
scenario was also “data poor” as timelines and age statistics only
were available throughout the challenge. Additionally, two small
partial transmission trees were also provided to the teams in the
same fashion as Scenario 3.
In summary, each scenario represented a diﬀerent level of diﬃculty
for the modeling teams. In particular, Scenario 1 was an idealized case,
with timely availability of data, but without neglecting the presence of
a fog of war that would be unreasonable to rule out in any real world
situation.
3.2. Data format
In order to provide consistent data query capabilities to all teams,
we set up a dedicated challenge database oﬀering a number of query
masks according to the type of data available under each scenario. The
most granular data were available for Scenario 1, while data avail-
ability and noise gradually increased with Scenarios 2–4. The data ex-
plorer interface ran as a Python Flask application with a MySQL data-
base, served through the Apache web service. For each scenario, the
interface provided daily/weekly and national/county-level timelines
for the following outcomes:
• New conﬁrmed and probable EVD cases.
• New EVD cases among health care workers.
• New EVD deaths in the population.
• New EVD deaths among health care workers.
• Number of new contacts traced.
• ETU occupancy – number of beds occupied, counting each bed each
day.
• New suspected EVD cases.
For most scenarios, the above data were not available at all times
nor at the county level. For some scenarios, a number of timelines were
not available at all as discussed in Section 3.1. Further, the timelines
made available to the participating teams were post-processed with the
addition of noise in order to simulate problems in data reporting as
detailed in Section 3.3.
A second type of data ﬁle generated from the model contained in-
dividual-level records for all hospitalized patients with a complete
Fig. 4. Snapshot of the landing web page providing the challenge parti-
cipants access to the database and the Supplementary Information re-
garding each scenario.
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medical record (patients who were discharged, dead or buried). A full
list of the information provided in the patient record database is pro-
vided in the supplementary information ﬁle. Similar to the timelines,
the patient databases were released after the addition of noise simu-
lating missing or incomplete records as detailed in Section 3.3. Dates
were expressed in number of days. The outbreak day (week) noted as
Day = 1 (Week = 1) was not necessarily the ﬁrst day (week) of the
epidemic. On Day (Week) 1 several cases could be reported at once and
in some cases from diﬀerent locations. Hence Day 1 should be con-
sidered as the ﬁrst day of reporting. From the patient databases, it was
in principle possible to reconstruct infection trees and generate statis-
tics for key natural history parameters such as the length of the in-
cubation period, the time from symptom onset to admission, the time
from admission to death, etc. The patient records however were re-
stricted to a subset of the epidemic and were limited to EVD cases ad-
mitted to the ETU/hospital and discharged with a ﬁnal outcome, and
traced contacts. Thus the patient database missed EVD cases that were
not admitted to the health care system. In addition, patient records
could contain missing information and errors. Similarly, the epidemic
timelines could include cases for whom the full patient record was not
yet released. In summary, disease timelines and patient records were
handled as separate datasets.
3.3. Fog of war
In real world situations, data are not communicated in real time,
and a variable degree of under-reporting is always present.
Furthermore, patient records contain errors and, even more often,
missing data, which all contribute to the “fog of war”. Therefore, it
would have been highly unrealistic to provide participating teams the
direct output of the Ebola model without addition of noise. The syn-
thetic epidemic curves and patient-level data shared with the challenge
participants thus included stochastic noise added by post-processing the
model outputs according to ﬁlters that mirrored real-world problems in
data collection, including underreporting and reporting delays. As a
result, the post-processed synthetic data became the actual ground truth
for the assessment of the teams’ performances. Although measurement
errors and data collection issues are widely known to the community of
epidemiologists and disease modelers, the data collected through epi-
demiological surveillance is always used as the benchmark for modeling
predictions.
In deﬁning the “fog of war” we introduced the following sources of
noise. We assumed that all cases arising from the pool of contact traced
patients were reported. For patients admitted to the hospital or ETU
outside of contact-tracing eﬀorts, we assumed a 90% probability of
reporting. For the remaining cases who had neither been admitted to
medical units nor contact-traced, we assumed a 30% reporting prob-
ability. The level of noise applied to the data is informed by the lit-
erature on underreporting and missing data during the West Africa
outbreak (WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014; Scarpino et al., 2014;
Atkins et al., 2015). The latter simulates a large amount of under-re-
porting typically occurring when the health care system breaks down
and cases are not admitted to the health care system. All timelines
provided to the Challenge's teams were based on reported cases and
thus had an intrinsic under-reporting factor. The level of under-re-
porting ﬂuctuated in time, reﬂecting both the changing situation on the
ground during the epidemic (variable number of ETUs, contact tracing
capacity, etc.) and the intrinsic binomial noise associated with the re-
porting probability. The latter was more pronounced when the number
of cases was small. Finally, suspected cases were drawn from the subset
of EVD cases without medical treatment. To further mimic the issue of
missing or inaccurate data arising in real-world situations, we also
added noise to the patient-level records, as detailed in the supple-
mentary information ﬁle.
In Fig. 5 we report the diﬀerence between the challenge model's
timeline before and after the addition of the noise ﬁlter. Fluctuations in
the epidemic curves tended to emphasize or attenuate natural ﬂuctua-
tions inherent to the stochastic model depending on the phase of the
outbreak and the speciﬁc scenario. While we used plausible arguments
in deﬁning the level of under-reporting and noise in the Ebola challenge
data, we did not want to mimic speciﬁc and well-known data issues
associated with the 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola outbreak. The aim
was to build in uncertainties that the participating teams could not
easily extrapolate from the literature, as was initially the case for the
2014–2015 Ebola epidemic.
3.4. Situation reports
In real world situations, quantitative epidemiological data are
generally integrated in situation reports that also provide qualitative
descriptions of the situation on the ground. Situation reports also
contain information about the planning of control interventions and
other news that although not quantitative can guide interpretation of
the trends observed in numerical data. In order to provide context to
the teams participating in the challenge, we issued a scenario-speciﬁc
narrative with each data release, akin to a situation report, typically
providing the following information:
• Approximate geographical distribution of cases and health care
workers infections (when not provided explicitly in a timeline).
• Opening of new Ebola treatment units.
• Level of contact tracing.
• Compliance to safe burial protocol.
A typical situation report for the Ebola forecasting challenge is in-
cluded in the Supplementary Information ﬁle. The level and accuracy of
the situation report diﬀered across scenarios, in the same way that data
availability diﬀered. The information contained in the situation report
was purposely not always accurate, simulating uncertainty and mis-
reporting due to the fog of war.
3.5. Infection trees
In real-world situations, the quality and richness of data provided to
the research community improves with time. This is because with time
an increasing number of cases can be analyzed, more eﬃcient data
collection strategies and databases are put in place, and knowledge
about the disease and the transmission mechanisms improves. During
the 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic, a turning point for the modeling
community was the publication of transmission tree data. Those data
allowed a detailed understanding of heterogeneity in Ebola transmis-
sion, and the contribution of diﬀerent settings to Ebola transmission
and behavioral practices (Faye et al., 2015; Ajelli et al., 2015;
Nyenswah et al., 2015; Fasina et al., 2014; Coltart et al., 2015). Ac-
cordingly, at the time of the set of forecast for the last set of target dates
from the participating teams, we provided transmission trees for three
scenarios of the challenge. For Scenario 1, we provided one large
branch of the transmission tree, covering a typical transmission period
associated with weak intervention (safe burial only was carried out),
followed by strong control (ETU units in place). For Scenario 3 and
Scenario 4, we provided two relative small branches representing weak
and strong interventions. The transmission trees were provided in the
same format as the line lists of patients as detailed in Section 3.2. The
patient records used for the transmission trees were supposed to be
documented with accuracy, and were provided without missing entries.
Fig. 6 displays the visualization of the rich transmission tree branch
provided for Scenario 1. It is important to stress that these supple-
mentary data could not be used by the team to revise past forecasts. The
aim of the infection trees release was to simulate what happened during
the real world West African outbreak when at a later stage of the out-
break more detailed data were made available, and to see if the parti-
cipating teams would use those data to improve parameters estimation
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in the ﬁnal part of the challenge.
4. Discussion
The possibility of using synthetic data in deﬁning modeling chal-
lenges is a new framework that allows to overcome some of the issues
encountered in forecast of actual data. First, it is possible to conduct
synthetic challenges for infectious diseases for which outbreak data are
scarce. Furthermore synthetic challenges make it possible to control the
amount and quality of data released to the teams to provide diﬀerent
degree of complications in the modeling eﬀort. The synthetic challenge
framework thus allows for the practice of modeling approaches, fore-
casting methodologies and integrative schemes on a wide range of
diseases and contextual situations that would not otherwise be avail-
able if constrained to retrospective analysis of historical outbreaks.
While the analysis of the forecast and analysis produced by the
teams participating in the RAPIDD Ebola forecasting challenge are re-
ported in a separate paper (Viboud et al., 2017), here we aimed to
provide a detailed description of the model used to generate synthetic
Ebola epidemic curve and patient-level data, the post-processing steps
Fig. 5. Weekly number of cases in the original model output and as provided for the challenge after adding noise and underreporting. (A) Scenario 1. (B) Scenario 2. (C) Scenario 3. (D)
Scenario 4. Vertical lines indicate the 5 data release dates of each scenario, corresponding to 5 prediction times points.
Fig. 6. A visualization of a branch of the EVD transmission tree in Scenario 1. Nodes of various colors and shapes denote diﬀerent type of EVD patients. Links denote the transmission
routes among cases.
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taken to make the data more realistic, and the synthetic situation re-
ports developed to provide contextual information to the challenge
participants.
Below we summarize some of the lessons learned about the pre-
paration of the challenge. A ﬁrst takeaway is that the data format and
the database setup have to be clearly documented and tested by the
participating teams. We released a dummy database a few weeks before
of the start of the challenge so that the teams could prepare their data
mining tools and software. We also prepared “Read Me” documents and
a FAQ section of the database. We realize that this level of preparation
is not generally possible in real-world situations.
The procedure used to simulate fog of war in the Ebola Challenge
was only one of a virtually inﬁnite set of procedures that could be
possibly devised to mimic real-world scenarios. Furthermore, one has to
consider that the fog of war could be of a very diﬀerent kind if the
synthetic challenge were to focus on a diﬀerent disease or a diﬀerent
country. In the preparation of a synthetic challenge, the choice of the
quality and reliability of the data made available to the participants
should be carefully gauged against historical experience and current
practices in data collection and sharing. It is also important that the
modeling teams are not aware of the changes applied to the model and/
or the kind of fog of war applied to the model's output. It would also
relevant to systematically investigate what level of noise in the data
comprises the ability of the modeling teams to recover epidemiological
information consistent with the underlying outbreak.
It is worth remarking that synthetic challenges depend on a clever
choice of epidemic scenarios. The aim is to have the modelers group
facing situations that can be useful for future events and fall into a
broad range of plausible situations. At the same time the synthetic data
should challenge the competing teams with patterns and data that
cannot be easily matched against past events. If this is not the case, the
modeling teams could just leverage on the past experience, voiding the
learning process aimed at by synthetic challenges. In our case the
competing teams did not know what kind of fog of war was in the data,
what kind of interventions were implemented in the diﬀerent scenarios
and where the natural history of the disease was set in the range of
plausible parameters. While this certainly provides a lot of uncertainty
to modeling teams, more severe situations in which even the kind of
pathogen is unknown can be devised. We believe the this ﬂexibility on
the prior knowledge of modeling teams, is one more added value to
synthetic challenges that cannot be replicated by using real world data.
Although the Ebola challenge considered four synthetic scenarios of
Ebola-like outbreaks in a relatively small country such as Liberia, re-
sulting in a small number of cases (< 10,000 reported EVD cases), data
generation and database preparation required considerable computa-
tional resources. Extending synthetic challenges to pandemic threat
scenarios, such as a ﬂu pandemic for instance, would have to consider
the potential for quick international spread. This would imply running
large scale global epidemic simulations and handling databases span-
ning multiple countries, raising the issue of scalability. Synthetic
challenges could provide useful drills for the disease modeling com-
munity and guide preparedness for major emerging health threats
across the world. However commitment of adequate resources is re-
quired to allow for a proper level of realism to be built-in, and is key to
successfully inform disease forecasting in real-world emergencies.
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